Theories of interest intermediation maintain that the formation of bargaining positions in the European Union follows a distinctive bargaining style. This article evaluates such claims empirically. It compares the predictive accuracy of Nash bargaining models that take the distinctive features of five types of interest intermediation into account. We show that the interaction between government agencies, interest groups and parties in the formation of EU legislation is largely étatiste. When important private interests are at stake, the pattern is also quite often clientelistic or corporatist. The dominance of the state in the less politicised decision making processes is apparent in all four countries under consideration: Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Consociationalist arrangements are rare in this arena of public policy making. 
Introduction
Integration theorists have repeatedly clashed over the role that interest groups play in the process of European integration. Especially Haas (1958 Haas ( , 1964 argued that the activities of integrationist elites must be taken into account before cooperation can be realized. Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) demonstrated in this vein how multinational firms were pushing governments into the adoption of the 1992 program. These rosy assessments are in considerable contrast to negative effects that public choice scholars associate with interest groups. Gillingham (1991) has attributed the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community to the wishes of the cartelistic industry to receive increased government protection. In his history of the integration process, he laments the turn towards corporatist decision making under the reign of Commission President Delors (Gillingham 2003) . The resulting mixture between étatiste interventions and clientelism has, in the view of this ultra-libertarian author, contributed to the European growth problems.
The common problem of both the optimistic and the pessimistic statements is their shaky empirical foundation. As the comparative literature on interest intermediation is rather descriptive, we do not really know how interest groups and government interact in European Union decision making.
1 This paper tries against this backdrop to uncover the structure of interest intermediation for the domestic prenegotiations that take place after the European Commission has introduced a new legislative proposal. We will examine the formation of the bargaining stances across 15 proposals and four member states: Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. According to a rich literature, these states should follow a different logic of interest intermediation. While Great Britain is associated with a pluralist competition between interest groups, continental states have traditionally involved private actors in the preparation of legislative projects. Most authors suspect that corporatist forms of interest intermediation should also unfold in the domain of EU policymaking (Grote and Schmitter 1999) , while some researchers believe that consociationalism becomes 3 increasingly relevant within the European Union (Crepaz 2002 , but see also Bogaards and Crepaz 2002, Kaiser 2002 ).
The article takes issue with these claims and assesses the predictive accuracy of corporatist, consociationalist, pluralist, étatiste and clientelistic models of interest intermediation. Our evaluation of the competing models of interest intermediation relies on the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), a canonical tool in bargaining theory. Data on the preferences of the actors are derived from the National Decision Making in the European Union (NDEU) data set. Our comparative evaluation of the diverse bargaining models show that the étatiste NBS has the highest predictive accuracy; the consociationalist model, in return, provides the most inaccurate forecasts at the average. The findings reveal that the state is the ultimate arbiter in this domain and show, moreover, important differences between the four countries under examination. A comparative case study on one legislative proposal illustrates these divergences.
Patterns of Interest Intermediation in the four member states
The literature on interest intermediation still follows the traditions inaugurated by the pioneering work of Lehmbruch and Schmitter (Lehmbruch 1967 , Schmitter 1974 , Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982 . These authors advanced the hypothesis that the relationship between contending interest groups resembles corporatist rather than pluralist patterns of interaction.
Although the empirical significance of this conjecture is still not clear (Traxler and Knittel 2000) , there is an ever-increasing number of articles that analyze the causes and consequences of corporatist intermediation in Europe and beyond (Grote and Schmitter 1999) .
The growing importance of the European Union has affected this discussion in several ways. Most studies analyze the possible transformation of interest intermediation at the EU level (Andersen and Eliassen 1993 , Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998 , Mazey and Richardson 1993 , Pedler and Van Schendelen 1994 . Some studies contend that the European Union 4 increasingly shows corporatist features (Gorges 1996) , while others believe that the European Union is moving into a pluralist direction (Traxler and Schmitter 1995) . Crombez (2002) , by contrast, contends that no patterns should be recognizable in the aggregate because the preference profiles over the different decision making processes vary too much. This agnostic attitude has its predecessor in Freeman (1989) . He cautioned that patterns of interest intermediation might perhaps be observable for sectors, but probably not for countries or, in our case, for a supranational entity like the European Union.
Only a handful of studies examine how interest groups try to influence their governments at the domestic level (Van Schendelen 1993). Greenwood and Jordan (1993) believe that the national channel of influence is still dominant in Great Britain. Based on an extensive survey Eising (2004) contends that "national and EU associations have established a pronounced division of labor among them".
The large number of conflicting hypotheses makes it quite hard to assess whether interest intermediation in the European Union matches a specific pattern. A further problem for such an assessment is the profusion of competing definitions of key concepts. This is most obvious for the category of "corporatism" which is often employed as a general term that covers all sorts of conflicts of interests although it has mainly been designed for usage in the context of business-labor interactions. In a thorough evaluation of the existing literature, Siaroff (1999) has identified 22 "structures" that are supposedly characteristic of a corporatist political economy, and he evaluates the empirical significance of 23 competing rankings.
These qualifications have to be kept in mind for the attempt undertaken in this paper to test the predictive accuracy of different systems of interest intermediation for the domestic pre-negotiations on EU-politics. If we first refer to the conventional distinction between "corporatism" and "pluralism", most observers agree that the four countries under examination should be differently classified. According to Siaroff's survey of 23 rankings (1999) 2 , the Netherlands is the most corporatist country, followed by Germany, Finland and 5 the United Kingdom. If we also take the institutional characteristics of a country into account, the dichotomy between majoritarian and consensus democracies seems to be most useful. Ersson (1997, 1999) 3 use the rankings of different authors on this dimension and establish that Finland can be considered to be the most consensual country of the four states under examination and the United Kingdom the most majoritarian.
The literature lets us expect that domestic pre-negotiations should follow, by and large, the general patterns of interest intermediation prevailing in a member state. This would mean that Finnish interactions should be corporatist or consociationalist and that the government should be biased in favour of workers and consumers. In the Netherlands and in Germany, the corporatist system of interest intermediation should show a bias towards business and producer interests. The literature finally suggests that Great Britain is dominated by a pluralist mode of interaction. As we have found state actors (Schneider and Baltz 2005) and producers interests (2003) to be particularly influential in analysis of the lobbying success of actor groups, we will also consider étatiste and clientelist interest intermediation as possibly prevailing modes of interaction in EU legislative decision making at the national level.
In the following, we will test whether interest intermediation in the domestic prenegotiations of EU legislations follows a particular logic. As the actor positions should be related to each other on a specific question, we will introduce different negotiation models and evaluate their predictive accuracy. Such an issue level analysis is more appropriate than an actor-focused approach for an evaluation of different systems of interest intermediation not the least because the relative success of one actor within one issue depend on the efforts of competing groups, rendering a comparison of individual actors not impossible, but at least complicated. The baseline for all competing bargaining models is the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash 1950 ) which seems especially appropriate in light of the broad consensus that 6 bargaining is the dominant decision making mode in systems of interest intermediation (Lehmbruch 1976 ).
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Research Design
We operationalised all variables using the National Decision Making in the European Union data set (NDEU). This data set contains detailed information on 15 legislative proposals that the European Commission initiated and that were between 1997 and 1999 submitted to the member states for consideration. The NDEU cases refer to a larger sample of around 70 legislative proposals that are fully analysed in the publication of the Decision Making in the European Union (DEU) research group (Thomson et al. 2006, Stokman and .
The DEU data set is a stratified sample of the legislative proposals of the European
Commission from 1997 to 2000. The 15 proposals we examine here cover very different policy areas, reaching from health over consumer to fishery policy. Table 1 shows furthermore differences in the number of contested issues that these proposals created, the number of actors and the variance of the policy positions.
(( Table 1 here))
We relied on expert interviews and secondary sources to gather the decision making data.
Four collaborators from the University of Konstanz were sent, after initial inquires about the competence and availability of the prospective interview partners, to the four member states to conduct structured in-depth elite interviews. The research assistants asked the policy experts about their knowledge on the domestic negotiations which precede the interactions within the Council of Ministers. The experts identified first the controversial issues within a proposal. Our research teams then asked them to name the actors that became active within the decision making process. They also had to locate the ideal points of these stakeholders on each issue and the final position of the ministry in charge for the pre-negotiations on each issue of importance in the domestic pre-negotiations. If possible, they had to pinpoint the 7 reference point (the outcome chosen in case the piece of legislation is not accepted) and the saliency each actor attributed to a proposal.
To render the proposals comparable, we normalized all actor positions, their power and the possible outcomes on scales ranging from 0 to 100. Hence, the underlying assumption of the research endeavour is that we can represent policy conflict on a continuous scale. ( 1) where i=1,...,n is the subscript for the stakeholders and To avoid this problem of indeterminacy, we assume in line with cooperative game theory that all actors benefit from a collective agreement. We therefore operationalize each player´s disagreement value as a function of what she can expect to achieve without cooperation. The disagreement value reflects each player´s capability to avoid the worst case scenario in case no agreement is reached; the capability in itself is assumed to be a function of each player's relative bargaining strength. 6 The disagreement value is accordingly defined as follows: 
A proposal on jurisdiction in e-commerce as an illustration
In this section we illustrate our model evaluation strategy with the results from a case study.
We have chosen the legislative proposal COM (99) 348 which deals with civil and commercial judicial cooperation in the EU and the enforcement of judgments by revisions of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions as an example. This Commission proposal is based on these already existing Conventions, which were first discussed in the early 1970s. One goal of 10 the legislative project was to broaden the scope of the existing legislation to deal with issues like e-commerce. The main dispute that the Commission proposal created refers to the different possibilities of jurisdiction. Yet, the conflicts that this proposal created at the domestic level were not purely legalistic. As important economic interests were at stake, producer and consumer organizations became active besides the lead ministry and other state actors.
We plot for each member state the positions of the activated stakeholders on the issue.
In the event that the Commission proposal opened up a multi-dimensional policy space in a member state, we restrain our visualization of the relative positions of the stakeholders to the most important issue of the proposal. The majority of the bargaining models predict the outcome correctly or are at least close to it.
The model with the highest prediction error is the clientelist model with actor positions on the left side of the ministry.
Great Britain: This case differs from the other three member states since the Lord Chancellor's Department was the domestic agenda setter and not the Ministry of Justice. The
British government thus viewed this legislative proposal much more as a financial then a purely legalistic matter. Yet, there have not been any substantive disputes on this proposal in Great Britain. Some disagreement arose over the question of whether or not a regulation was necessary at all. Another discussion involved the question which court should be responsible to decide on disputes concerning e-commerce contracts. The general rule in international private law is that the court in the consumer's country is responsible but there are efforts to change this in view of the huge amount of SME e-commerce suppliers which cannot afford the cost of legal procedures in other member states. But the British government refused to fight for this position although it was supported by all departments involved. It feared that a discussion endangered the whole compromise already achieved between the member states.
But they agreed to support each member state that would put forward such a proposal while ensuring that this would be the only change to the compromise.
The only remaining issue of importance was whether e-commerce judgments should be included in the regulation or not. E-commerce traders, advertising associations and the The descriptive evidence of this case study shows that there are significant differences between the four member states with respect to mobilization of stakeholders. We could thus expect that government agents would be largely successful with their proposal in those countries where the conflict intensity was low (UK and Finland); the étatiste model should accordingly have the highest predictive accuracy among the competing models of interest intermediation. Other explanations should be, conversely, more successful in predicting the outcome in Germany and the Netherlands where the Commission proposal led to more intense discussions.
Our calculations of the distance between the outcome and the predictions confirm these suspicions. Hence, the étatiste model fares best in Finland and the UK with in fact no prediction error at all in both countries. The accuracy of the corporatist and the consociationalist models has to do with the fact that they are largely identical with the etatiste model since the number of non-state actors is relatively small. In Germany and the Netherlands one of the models incorporating the position or power of interest groups fare at least as good as the étatiste model or, in the Dutch case, much better.
Predictive Accuracy of the Interest Intermediation Models
In this section we evaluate the predictive accuracy of the competing models of interest intermediation for all issues in all four member states, using different evaluation criteria to 16 assess the predictive accuracy of the bargaining models. The first measure we employ is the mean absolute error (MAE) of the predictions on each issue, which is a standard benchmark ranging from 0 (no error) to 100 (maximal error). Table 3 reports the MAEs of the seven different models for all issues and for each of the four member states separately together with the maximum error of each model. Note that we do not include the asymmetric version of the corporatist and consociationalist models because their results do not differ significantly from those of the symmetric ones.
( (Table 3 about here))
The results reported in Table 3 show that one model, the symmetric étatiste model, fares best in comparison to all other models examined here. The corporatist model and the pluralist model that takes the power asymmetries between the actors into account are ranked next to it.
The symmetric pluralist model and one of the clientelistic models are in between, while the consociationalist model is at the bottom of the ranking. Comparing the two clientelistic models against each other confirms that those stakeholders seem to win from the domestic bargainings which are more integration-prone than the lead ministry, since a higher value on the 100-point preference scale indicates in most cases a more integration-prone attitude. The ranking between the two clientelistic models is only reversed in Germany. This means that the German ministry which is in charge of coordinating the domestic response to a Commission proposal is slightly more influenced by integration-sceptical groups than the "agenda setting" state actors in the other countries. This is also an indication of a particular political bias:
Because "integration" often stands for consumer rather than producer friendly legislation, the German government often yields towards the pressure exerted by business lobbies (Schneider and Baltz 2003) .
The evaluation also underlines the role that state actors play in EU politics. The difference in the predictive accuracy of the consociationalist and the corporatist model illustrates this. The two models only differ insofar as the former excludes the lead ministry and the latter includes it as relevant stakeholders. A detailed analysis of the agenda setting capacity of the state actors confirms that the ministry formally in charge possesses considerable discretion during the domestic pre-negotiations across the four member states (Schneider and Baltz 2005) .
Quite remarkably, the relative differences between the models are generalisable across all four member states under examination. Even in those countries purported to have a corporatist system of interest intermediation, the étatiste model offers at the average the most precise forecasts. Because the lead ministry did often not have to change its initial position in Great Britain, the coporatist and especially the étatiste model fare particularly well for this country. This means that in Great Britain state actors dominate the domestic bargaining processes that EU legislative proposals initiate. Great Britain also does not seem to be more pluralist than Germany or the Netherlands, which contradicts the textbook classifications of the systems of interest intermediation prevailing in these countries.
8
As Bueno de Mesquita (2004) has recently argued, the MAE has some shortcomings as a yardstick for model evaluation. It understates for instance the predictive error of a model as far as the maximum prediction error is a relevant consideration for predictive success. The MAE also does not take border or ceiling effects into account. We can therefore expect that the MAE correlates both negatively or positively with the number of alternative positions on an issue. If, for example only the extreme positions of the issue continuum are occupied (0 and 100) and the prediction is at 50, the maximum prediction error can be only 50 points. If more than two (extreme) positions are issued (for example three at 0, 75, and 100 respectively) and the prediction is at 75, the maximum error can be 25 (if the outcome is 100) or 75 (if the outcome is at the other extreme side of the preference scale).
A second evaluation benchmark, the number of point predictions, avoids these problems. Table 4 provides the predictive accuracy of the models in this respect. We distinguish three "margins of error". The first level of tolerance allows for deviations of 0.1% of the entire range, the second one extends this to 1% and the third criterion to 10%.
( (Table 4 here))
The results reported in Table 4 Table 4 suggests again that the predictions of the consociationalist model remain quite imprecise; government actors are, in other words, necessary for our understanding of EU interest intermediation at the domestic level. The errors of the pluralist and the clientelistic models seem to be much more concentrated around an "average" error level. These bargaining games offer fewer perfect hits than the corporatist model but also have a lower maximum error than the consociationalist model.
9
These results should caution those researchers who draw conclusions about the system of interest intermediation in one country from studies focussing only on one policy field, one piece of legislation or one country alone. Our analysis shows that such generalizations disregard that European legislation involves a varying set of actors across countries and proposals. Interest interemediation can thus be within the same country once pluralist, on other occasions clientelistic or the negotiations can solely take place among state actors. The empirical evidence also suggests that an étatiste model of bargaining predicts the actual outcome at the average most precisely. Consociationalist patterns are, in return, less frequent than some part of the literature on interest intermediation lets us expect.
We have also conducted some sensitivity analyses to identify the factors that contribute to the forecasting error of the models. The main finding is that a polarization in the preferences of the actors exerts a strong influence on the accuracy of the predictions. Other measures of the preference distribution like the variance or the skewness are only significant for some models.
Conclusion
We examined in this paper whether we can use the conventional classifications of the systems of interest intermediation for four member states of the European Union to predict the national bargaining position of the ministry negotiating at the Council level. First, our empirical analysis revealed that the pattern of interest intermediation in the domestic prenegotiations is less clear-cut than assumed by the literature on systems of interest intermediation. The activation and coalition pattern among state and non-state actors vary so much across the different proposals that general typologies can only explain to some extent the domestic pre-negotiations. This supports the implicit impossibility thesis of Crombez (2002) and Freeman (1989) that almost no generalizations about interest intermediation are possible. Second, our analysis also underlines that state actors dominate the national negotiations on most issues. Yet, if non-state actors become involved, a corporatist understanding of the negotiations is much more helpful than a consociationalist one. Third, the predictive success of the corporatist model depends heavily on the inclusion of the state actors. This is a striking blow for the proponents of the thesis that the system of interest intermediation moves into an era where strong associate could counter-balance the influence of the national governments. Although governments have to respect the interests of their 20 stakeholders to some extent, they possess ample and largely uncontrolled discretion in EU affairs. Our analysis has finally also broken new ground by bringing the combination of formal models and systematic tests to the study of interest group behaviour in the European Union. While the field is slowly moving towards a systematic assessment of specific actor groups (Woll 2006) , it has up to now shied away from rigorously evaluating systems of interest intermediation. The paper show that we can use applied game theory for this purpose. Note: The official notation of these legislative proposal is, in descending order, as follows.
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Com (97) Table 3 ). to the bargaining space between 0 and 100 and we relied on the constrained optimisation routine in GAUSS for the calculation of the optimized solution. We used the Newton algorithm as optimization method and employed the mean as the starting vector in all models. The mean was calculated from the positions of all national stakeholders on each issue of a proposal. As indicated in the acknowledgments, the GAUSS routine that was used to calculate the bargaining solutions can be found on the replication homepage of the first author. 6 We owe this suggestion to James D. Fearon. We also conducted calculations involving a common diasgreement value to be able to compare our results if they are sensitively depend upon the operationalization of the disagreement point. The results of the calculations using a common diagreement value changed only slightly.
The same is true if the actors' probability to encounter the worst case scenario is defined by his relative distance to the reference point. 7 The following description of the domestic negotiation processes in the four member states is based upon the interviews with the experts and the summaries of our interviewers. An accompanying table that offers summary evidence can be found on the replication homepage of the first author. 9 A third and for direct comparisons between the models more useful measure is the number of times that one model forecasted the outcome better than another one. We do not present the results from this prediction error measure because its results corroborate in general those gained by the MAE measure.
10 Some stakeholders have not been active on all three issues of this proposal. They are thought to be indifferent between the national status quo and the position of the leading ministry, so we imputed the mean between the reference point and the initial position of the leading ministry as their position on those issues. Issue 3 has no clear reference point, therefore the initial position of the leading ministry was imputed for the actors active on the other issues but not on the third one.
